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Nietzsche’s Goal of Friendship 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to illuminate the topic of Redlichkeit in The Gay 
Science in order to provide a greater understanding of the relationship between 
friendship, knowledge-seeking and overcoming in Nietzsche’s GS and Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In GS 14 Nietzsche formulates friendship as involving “a shared higher 
thirst for an ideal.” Although higher friendship, for Nietzsche, involves a mutual goal, 
this paper argues that the goal is not truth. First, the notion of the intellectual conscience 
and how passionate knowledge-seeking is distinguished from the standardized practices 
of truth that Nietzsche rejects is explained. Second, the problem of the Übermensch, or 
Overhuman, and its status as an ideal or goal is examined. In conclusion, the link that 
Nietzsche makes between becoming Overhuman and the development of Redlichkeit by 
the intellectual conscience in passionate knowledge-seeking friendship is explained. 
 
 
 
 
“But say to me now, my brothers: if humanity still lacks a goal, does it not also lack—
itself?—” Z I “On the Thousand Goals and One.” 
 
 In GS Nietzsche characterizes the experimental path of the knowledge-seeker as one that 
is vulnerable to great instability. He compares “truths” to skins that are shed again and 
again through the practice of critical engagement with the self and others.
1
 “Life as means 
to knowledge” is praised by Nietzsche (GS 324), however in order for one’s knowledge to 
gain relevance it must be repeatedly questioned (GS 335). In Z Nietzsche writes that it is 
important to fight for understanding and to even “triumph” when one’s arguments are 
defeated by an opponent (Z I “On War and Warrior-Peoples”). Learning through 
agonistic interactions that support critique between peers is emphasized. Nietzsche 
expresses the need for friends to challenge beliefs, to inspire each other into overcoming 
and to “a yearning for the Overhuman” (Z I “On the Friend”).  
The purpose of this essay is to illuminate the topic of Redlichkeit in GS in order to 
provide a greater understanding of the relationship between friendship, knowledge-
seeking and overcoming in GS and Z.
2
 In GS 14 Nietzsche formulates friendship as 
involving “a shared higher thirst for an ideal.” I read this section to mean that higher 
friendship, for Nietzsche, involves a mutual goal, but this goal is not truth. In order to 
bring greater clarity to Nietzsche’s treatment of truth in GS and provide evidence for my 
claim that there is an alternative goal of friendship outlined by Nietzsche in Z, I focus on 
two important Nietzschean concepts. First, the notion of the intellectual conscience and 
how passionate knowledge-seeking is distinguished from the standardized practices of 
truth that Nietzsche rejects is discussed. Second, the problem of the Übermensch, or 
Overhuman, and its status as an ideal or goal is examined. I question the feasibility of the 
Overhuman and ask why Nietzsche thinks such an ideal is required. In conclusion, the 
link that Nietzsche makes between becoming Overhuman and the development of 
 Redlichkeit by the intellectual conscience in passionate knowledge-seeking friendship is 
explained. 
 
Goal-Oriented Friendship 
Nietzsche values a goal-oriented friendship in which two people come together in the 
interest of shared striving. In GS 14 Nietzsche writes, “Here and there on earth we may 
encounter a kind of continuation of love in which this possessive craving of two people 
for each other gives way to a new desire and lust for possession—a shared higher thirst 
for an ideal above them. But who knows such love? Who has experienced it? Its right 
name is friendship.” In this section Nietzsche differentiates friendship from erotic love 
and neighborly love relationships in which the same drive gives rise to love and greed 
(Habsucht). Friendship allows for a sublimation or refinement of this tyrannical drive into 
a more productive outlet so the attention of the people involved is oriented to the 
actualization of an ideal instead of the possession of one another. Friendship as goal-
oriented thus becomes a creative and disciplined solution to the problem of immoderate 
egoism and its multiple expressions, especially for those who have an excess of energy 
and a hunger for power.  
The advantages of cultivating goal-oriented friendships are numerous within 
Nietzsche’s framework. In GS 14 and 13 Nietzsche suggests that people in general are 
mostly interested in having a feeling of power and are willing to use and hurt others in 
order to achieve this (although those who hurt are considered to be lacking in power as 
opposed to those who benefit others). Nietzsche states that the hunger to possess that 
which is new is often expressed hastily and repeatedly. Those experiencing this drive 
 enact an inconsiderate consumerism that bores easily and has a propensity to be 
exploitative of others in its need to assimilate. The structure of a goal-oriented friendship 
provides a foundation for this drive to face resistance and, if the friends are well matched, 
a prolonged experience of challenge and learning. 
Instead of attempting to incorporate the other person as Nietzsche states tends to be 
the case in both neighborly and erotic love relationships, goal-oriented friendships are 
grounded on mutual admiration and friends do not employ the other for self-
aggrandizement or escapism. In order to recognize the other person as a worthy partner in 
the attempt to meet a particular goal, admiration and respect for the other person’s 
relevant abilities are necessary. In addition, Nietzsche suggests that enmity has a role to 
play within friendship because it encourages competition and the development of “virtue 
(Tugend), virility (Männlichkeit) and cheerfulness (Heiterkeit)” (GS 169). Nietzsche 
shares the sentiments of Montaigne whose writings on the art of conversation include the 
statement that “I like a strong, intimate, manly fellowship, the kind of friendship which 
rejoices in sharp vigorous exchanges just as love rejoices in bites and scratches which 
draw blood.”3 Montaigne and Nietzsche view argumentative friendship as an opportunity 
to exercise one’s skills; they believe that critique should be welcomed, not avoided. 
Nietzsche writes that one’s best enemy is found in the friend: “You should be closest to 
him in your heart when you strive against him” (Z I “On the Friend”). He considers the 
unique kind of intimacy that friends share when they bring a degree of enmity into their 
relationship to be important: the push and pull of goal-oriented friends inspire shared 
questioning and expose aspects of the self that would not ordinarily be visible. Nietzsche 
 writes, “let us be enemies too, my friends! Divinely we want to strive against each 
other!”(Z II “On the Tarantulas”).  
The competitive nature of this kind of higher friendship allows for a striving which 
can be both therapeutic and transformative. Friends can provide the kind of resistance 
necessary that Nietzsche later states in GM is important for discharging the will to power 
and preventing the development of the bad conscience.
4
 For example, difficult and 
potentially destructive emotions such as envy are utilized in order to motivate striving: 
instead of envy of the friend driving one to harm him, that envy inspires one to attempt to 
be similar to or better than his friend. When mutual admiration is present, a certain level 
of intellectualized enmity drives competition and encourages critical engagement 
between peers while also providing an outlet for aggressive emotions. The passions of the 
knowledge seeker, which are neither objective nor indifferent (GS 351), can be 
moderated through opposition. By sharing an argumentative engagement with one 
another, friends, especially those who have different passionate motivations, engage in a 
discourse that allows for greater recognition of the other and his perspectives to occur. 
The shared goal of the friends provides structure for the intensity of the interaction and 
allows for a sustained practice of emotional sublimation and intellectual intimacy.  
Although Nietzsche does not name one specific higher ideal of friendship in GS 14, 
he does nevertheless state that the distinguishing feature of friendship is “a shared higher 
thirst for an ideal.” Robert Miner, who also turns to GS 14 in order to claim that “superior 
friendship” has a higher goal for Nietzsche, argues that this goal is truth.5 I believe this is 
a misreading of Nietzsche: Miner fails to explain the central role that questioning plays in 
Nietzsche’s treatment of truth. What Hannah Arendt wrote about Lessing can be applied 
 to Nietzsche here: “his thinking was not a search for truth, since every truth that is the 
result of a thought process necessarily puts an end to the movement of thinking.”6 
Nietzsche’s discussion of truth is pointed toward its fallibility; friendship with a higher 
goal offers the friends an opportunity for greater criticality, not so the truth will be found, 
but instead so that one’s truths and methods of truth-seeking will be questioned, 
multiplied and re-created: or, in short, overcome. Nietzschean friends help each other 
develop a hermeneutics of suspicion, a practice integral for developing the no-saying 
spirit who looks at the motivation behind his truths to determine if they are worth 
maintaining a belief in. 
 
Truth and the Development of the Intellectual Conscience 
It is tempting to conclude that truth is the goal of friendship for Nietzsche, especially in 
the context of GS because there are so many instances in this text during which Nietzsche 
highlights the importance of being a knowledge-seeker or a warrior type that seeks out 
new ideas (See “Preparatory human beings” of GS 283). These praiseworthy types of 
people are not lost in Z either: Nietzsche writes of both saints of understanding (Heilige 
der Erkenntniss) and warriors of understanding and suggests that these two types of 
people are vital for the change that he conceives of as necessary to occur (Z I “On War 
and Warrior-Peoples”).7 In addition, he suggests in Z that competitive relationships, even 
relationships of intellectual warfare are instructive, and that for some people simply 
fighting for Erkenntnis is a sufficient and worthy path. However, the pursuit of 
Erkenntnis, translated as understanding, knowledge or awareness, is very different from 
the standardized practices of truth that Nietzsche undermines throughout his oeuvre.  
 In both GS and Z, the on-going cultivation of self-questioning is stressed in its 
relationship to knowledge-seeking, what Nietzsche calls the development of the 
intellectual conscience. Nietzsche explains that the intellectual conscience involves a 
healthy desire for certainty (Verlangen nach Gewissheit) that drives one to carefully 
question one’s beliefs and the forming of new judgments (GS 2). The majority of people, 
Nietzsche contends, are satisfied constructing their lives on beliefs that they have 
inherited which they have not taken the opportunity to weigh. Instead of testing out 
opinions or observing actions to determine relevance, people are content to refer to their 
conscience and their faith, especially when it comes to making moral judgments. 
Nietzsche challenges his reader and asks: “Have you never heard of an intellectual 
conscience? A conscience behind your “conscience”? Your judgment “this is right” has a 
pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences. “How 
did it originate there?” you must ask, and then also: “What is it that impels me to listen to 
it?”” (GS 335) When one cultivates the intellectual conscience, the conscience is 
requested to reflect upon the origins of its beliefs. As an alternative to simple unmeasured 
conclusions, Nietzsche suggests that the development of the intellectual conscience 
brings probity to one’s beliefs and assists in the refinement of judgment so that 
descriptions can become more precise.  
In GS 335 “Long live physics!” Nietzsche discusses how to engage in productive 
self-questioning: through the intellectual conscience one moves into a deconstructive 
mode that involves the “purification of our opinions and valuations.” What follows this 
“purification” is a new creating of this-world human values. When Nietzsche proclaims 
„Hoch die Physik!“ he is proposing the value of physics, as this-worldly, propelled by 
 human creation, over the other-world realm of metaphysics. Nietzsche writes that human 
beings must “give themselves laws…create themselves” (GS 335). The intellectual 
conscience is a tool from which Nietzsche states people can discover what is “lawful and 
necessary in the world.” The quality that Nietzsche states inspires one to pursue this 
specific orientation is Redlichkeit (GS 335): “And even more so that which compels us to 
turn to physics—our Redlichkeit!” 
Redlichkeit, translated as honesty in the Kaufmann edition of GS, but also meaning 
probity, is a term that Nietzsche returns to in Z, calling it the youngest virtue and linking 
it to “the one who understands (Erkennenden)” who is opposed to those who are sick and 
“long for God” (ZI “On Believers in a World Behind”). Redlichkeit is connected, like in 
GS 335, to this world on earth and the body and to becoming, Nietzsche states, what one 
is.
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 In order to become what one is, one must first learn how to measure the contents and 
drives of one’s beliefs. Goal-oriented friendships that reject the romantic escapism of 
erotic and neighborly love and embrace Redlichkeit as a shared practice enable 
passionate knowledge-seeking that is both this-worldly and self-impelled. 
Why so many people lack Redlichkeit and an intellectual conscience is associated 
with “Believers and their need to believe” (GS 347, 319). Metaphysics, faith, scientific 
positivism: all provide a strong foundation to rest upon and deactivate the will (GS 347), 
follow a paradigm and be comforted by a community of fellow believers. Instead of 
developing a practice of questioning, Nietzsche writes that people have an unconscious 
and repetitive motivation to seek out that which is a familiar and comfortable and form 
conclusions based on this (GS 355). There is also the drive within each person to make 
that which is unknown accessible through creating a story or “truth” about it: in Z, 
 Nietzsche connects this to the need to make all other beings “thinkable,” to define within 
the scope of one’s particular knowledge base and in doing so have a sense of control over 
the meaning of that thing (Z II “On Self-Overcoming”). In others words, it is easiest to 
choose a little truth that fits within one’s structures of belief. Although Nietzsche 
maintains that the search for knowledge is important, he concurrently problematizes the 
tunnel vision inevitable in its pursuit. Nietzsche points to cultural inheritances, including 
gender, socio-economic roles and ethnic backgrounds as formative of beliefs (GS 335). 
Even when the desire for certainty is functioning there is a tendency to unknowingly 
shape it in a particular direction, to create a new fiction or faith to give it stability (GS 
347), or to conform to accepted and useful humanized “truths” (GS 112). In Z Nietzsche 
writes that “The human being first put values into things, in order to preserve itself—it 
created a meaning for things, a human meaning!” (Z I: “On the Thousand Goals and 
One”). For Nietzsche, belief is shaped by a self-preserving need, one which has both 
cultural and biological components, as well as a drive to fulfill particular requirements of 
moral beliefs.
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 As such, Nietzsche indicates that “truth” should consistently be 
approached with a degree of skepticism and distance and even laughter at its 
conditionality. Truth is anything but indifferent (GS 351).  
Nietzsche explains that useful beliefs are most often supported beliefs which may in 
fact be errors, but over time due to their usefulness have gained credence; often that 
which demonstrates greater honesty as a truth has less visibility and is overshadowed by 
such useful beliefs (GS 110 e.g. “enduring things”). “Thus the strength of knowledge 
does not depend on its degree of truth, but on its age, on the degree to which it has been 
incorporated, on its character as a condition of life” (GS 110). One who attempts to 
 develop the intellectual conscience is not merely limited by the capacity to genuinely 
attempt self-questioning: the questions one asks will themselves be influenced by shared 
normalized errors taken as “truths.” According to Nietzsche, the desire for certainty is 
overshadowed by the drive for survival and its many mutations regardless of their 
validity; that which supports life often prevails over that which supports Redlichkeit, 
especially when honesty threatens life. The truths which are supported and come to be 
part of the accepted knowledge base are ones which have been reconciled with life as life 
preserving (GS 110). In Z the “famous wise men” are mocked for knowingly pandering 
to normalized errors, to the so-called truths of the people, and guaranteeing their survival 
this way. Zarathustra declares that for one to sincerely become truthful, one must reject 
the people’s God and truths, go into solitude and attempt to strip oneself of the prevalent 
discourses that shape one’s sources of knowledge (Z II “On the Famous Wise Men”).  
Nietzsche’s attack on the metaphysics of truth and his observation that the search 
for knowledge is inevitably hampered by many challenges both social and individual is 
well known and pervasive throughout his oeuvre. What makes it interesting in the context 
of a discussion of friendship and its goal, is whether Nietzsche conceives of friendship as 
having the potential to interrupt this regular ignorance and thus become a partial remedy 
to the limitations that one person faces during the solitary pursuit of truth. Considering 
that in Z becoming truthful is connected to rejecting the “the people,” “the rabble” and 
“the marketplace,” it is significant to ask how friendship differs. The question becomes: 
can the intellectual conscience, when exercised within the context of goal-oriented 
friendship, have a better chance at achieving greater honesty and probity than in solitude?  
 Before I attempt to answer this question, I would like to briefly address one other 
challenge that the intellectual conscience and Redlichkeit appear to face in terms of rigor, 
namely the psychological need for art. In GS Nietzsche states that people incorporate an 
aesthetic enjoyment into life and create stories in order to be able to emotionally sustain 
the tragic nature of existence. Art allows for the glorification of what has been appraised 
(GS 85) and it also has the capacity to make that which is deeply problematic, such as the 
erroneous nature of much of our knowledge, endurable. Although this may appear to be 
an impingement upon the accumulation of knowledge, Nietzsche states that it is 
necessary for survival. The alternative, raw honesty, is too unbearable and “would lead to 
nausea and suicide...We must discover the hero not less than the fool in our passion for 
knowledge” (GS 107). This need for artistry does not merely provide escape: art and 
religion also grant insight into the self through distance and a magnifying glass (GS 78). 
For example, Nietzsche explains that in watching theatre one may be drawn into self-
observation of one’s most despicable characteristics through connection with the 
characters of the play (GS 78). Thus, art, which can seem to limit the pursuit of 
knowledge as an expression of the drive for survival, has the ability to act as a 
spontaneous instigator of reflection into areas of one’s knowledge that may not be usually 
so available. When watching tragedy, for example, the spectator of antiquity did not 
rationalize the experience, instead he allowed himself to occupy what Tracy Strong calls 
an “ecstatic doubleness” (Strong, 54) because he became the character of the drama while 
concurrently remaining the spectator. This involves a mirroring experience in which 
openness and self-reflection are generated more spontaneously, and even with greater 
profundity, than the pointed approach which seeks final definitions of things. “What the 
 plays made possible as political education was not a benign pluralism but an agonism that 
sought only a word and never a final word” (Strong, 56). My impression is that, for 
Nietzsche, friendship can have a similar function in that it allows for openings to occur in 
one’s knowledge base, reflective openings that would not be so easy to come to in 
solitude.  
 
The Role of Friendship in Passionate Knowledge-Seeking 
What can the friend provide that one cannot find alone during an attempt to refine the 
intellectual conscience? Does the practice of solitude present particular limitations to 
knowlege-seeking that can be reconciled in friendship? How does friendship differ for 
Nietzsche from those communal spaces that he is so critical of, such as the marketplace? 
In order to answer these questions, it is helpful to examine why solitude is recommended 
in Z. 
As we have already seen, Nietzsche discusses how the concept of truth that each 
person holds is vulnerable to their cultural environment and to those people one spends 
time with. In order to become reflective, one must remove oneself from the distracting, 
repressive and manipulative influences of the external world and go into solitude. 
Nietzsche suggests that it is too difficult to try to pick out which beliefs one likes and 
dislikes if, for example, one is surrounded by the fulminations of politicians and 
journalists (Z I “On the Flies of the Market Place). In GS, Nietzsche also expresses 
concern over how education and societal values encourage one to become an object of 
usefulness for society instead of developing an individual path (GS 21 and 296). Going 
into solitude provides one with the opportunity to become more self-oriented, to learn 
 what is one’s own taste (Z III “On the Spirit of Heaviness” 2) and in doing so, also 
unlearn obeying (Z II “The Stillest Hour). One who seeks out understanding, Zarathustra 
states, must also experience isolation and a deep self-questioning that breaks through the 
ideology that has been self-sustaining in the past. Nietzsche employs the metaphor of a 
desert in order to explain the solitary experience of no-saying ideological cleansing: 
“Truthful—thus I call the one who goes into Godless deserts and has broken his 
reverential heart. In the yellow sands and burned by the sun he will squint thirstily at the 
islands rich in springs, where living beings repose beneath dark trees. But his thirst does 
not persuade him to become like those comfortable creatures: for where there are oases, 
there are also images of idols” (Z I “On the Famous Wise Men”). 
Solitude is an important therapeutic tool for the knowledge-seeker, one which 
cannot be overlooked. However, Nietzsche also acknowledges that solitude presents its 
own dangers which he suggests friendship can mediate. No matter how instructive 
solitude is, when prolonged a loss of human and social understanding is inevitable. In 
addition to the potential to become lost in one’s inner world and psychologically ill from 
spending too much time alone (Z I “On the Friend”), Nietzsche states that one’s self is 
very difficult to discover (Z III “On the Spirit of Heaviness” 2). In solitude one is likely 
to repeat the same stories and habits with which one came into solitude (Z IV “On the 
Superior Human” 13). A friend is a possible remedy to this predicament: if one can 
sustain shared critical engagement, the friend can show one parts of oneself that one was 
unaware of through intellectual confrontation, but also by taking a more subtle route 
(HAH 491). Nietzsche states that “higher human beings desire and provoke contradiction 
in order to receive some hint about their own injustices of which they are yet unaware” 
 (GS 297). Such people become involved in more argumentative relationships because 
they want to learn and grow, knowing that relationships which involve an element of 
refined enmity present the opportunity for greater knowledge discovery. 
Even Zarathustra comes out of the mountains to seek friendship because his 
solitude is not enough for him. Solitude is important for coming to understand one’s own 
truths but these truths only gain value once they are shared and tested out by others. In 
addition to his need to bestow and share his ideas with others, Zarathustra states that he 
requires friends with whom to cultivate his wisdom (Z II “The Child with the Mirror), 
companions that are more than believers of his teachings. He is looking for interlocutors 
with whom to engage so that he can gain greater honesty and probity in the development 
of his intellectual conscience and discover which “truths” he has yet to overcome.  
It is in the First Part of Z that we can gain an understanding of how Nietzsche 
distinguishes friendship from other kinds of sociality. The central concerns he has with 
associating one’s beliefs with larger more institutionalized groups of people is the 
pressure toward conformity that he considers to be active in such groups. Whether one 
follows the rules of the state or what is culturally or religiously popular, one remains a 
follower of what is widely accepted and does not take the opportunity to think for oneself 
(See “On the New Idol” and “On the Flies of the Market-Place”).  
Regarding other kinds of relationships, Nietzsche returns to his notions expressed in 
GS 14 that both erotic and neighborly love relationships are fuelled by romantic escapism 
or a desire to possess and incorporate the other instead of a drive toward a higher ideal. 
Rather than allowing the drive toward incorporation to fuel relationships and becoming a 
slave or tyrant in relation to this drive, Nietzsche recommends becoming a warrior of 
 understanding who openly struggles with the friend in order to reach greater Redlichkeit 
(See “On War and Warrior-Peoples” and “On the Friend”). Nietzsche’s approach to 
thinking is both agonistic and empathetic
10
: he views friendship as a vehicle for 
developing and multiplying perspectives so that one can have a more intensively 
developed knowledge base. João Constãncio explains Nietzsche’s knowledge-seeking 
method as engaging an “agonal empathy” which makes one “more personal and more 
partial” (136-7). Contrary to the standard notion that becoming more personal and partial 
makes one less “objective” Nietzsche believes the accumulation and analysis of a great 
number of perspectives deepens one’s knowledge.11 By engaging the intellectual 
conscience in the accumulation of these variant perspectives, and questioning the drives 
behind them, one can attempt to ascertain which perspectives have greater precision. 
Although Nietzsche does not think one can access a complete understanding of any thing 
(or person), it is possible to gain a more honest perspective of some thing. Goal-oriented 
friends who empathetically occupy their oppositional viewpoints and bring an agonistic 
standard of measure to these viewpoints through reflective questioning develop better 
descriptions of things (GS 112) and in doing so purify their opinions (GS 335). Instead of 
deceiving oneself into believing that this involves indifference, strict correspondence, or 
metaphysical insight, Redlichkeit assists one in understanding that each reflective 
questioning has a selective drive behind it and chooses to make observations based on 
personal relevance. Truth is not ascertained; instead the ongoing agonistic engagement of 
perspectives is refined and overcome through social engagement with the other. What a 
passionate knowledge-seeker can do, Nietzsche suggests, is build up enough wisdom, as 
Zarathustra attempts to do, so that one can become “the creating friend” who gives back 
 to one’s friends. This creating friend not only helps one in the pursuit of knowledge, he 
will also and more ideally be “a festival of the earth and a premonition of the 
Overhuman” (Z I “On Love of One’s Neighbor”). Truthfulness as probity, the practice of 
Redlichket by the intellectual conscience is an important aim of friendship, but it is not 
Nietzsche’s ultimate goal. When friends come together with a higher ideal in mind, 
passionately experimenting with knowledge in the hopes to find some truths is 
emphasized, but not as the goal of friendship; instead we should look to Zarathustra 
where the pursuit of knowledge is situated as part of a larger project of overcoming.  
 
Becoming Overhuman: The Importance of Friendship in Overcoming  
In Z Nietzsche writes, “May the future and the farthest be the cause of your today: in 
your friend shall you love the Overhuman as your own cause” (Z I “On Love of One’s 
Neighbor”). From this statement we can recognize that Nietzsche thinks friendship has a 
significant position to fill in the coming of the Overhuman. But, why does Nietzsche 
think we need the Overhuman? Who or what is the Overhuman? How can friendship 
provide a foundation for it? These are the primary questions of this section. 
There are a number of reasons why Nietzsche believes that we require the ideal of 
the Overhuman. Primarily, he thinks it is necessary for human beings to have an 
alternative to a monotheistic God, specifically a figure that the human imagination can 
grasp that is both closer to the human being and also open to individual interpretation. In 
GS Nietzsche discusses the advantages of polytheism over monotheism and points to the 
prevalence of non-normative diversity in polytheistic models that supports free-
spiritedness. He writes, “The invention of gods, heroes, and overmen (Uebermenschen) 
 of all kinds…was the inestimable preliminary exercise for the justification of the egoism 
and sovereignty of the individual” (GS 143). The Overhuman who is described 
ambiguously by Nietzsche as “the sense of the earth” as opposed to the other-worldly is 
meant to replace the shadow of the Christian God (GS 108) as a spiritual symbol that 
encourages unique thought and creativity in the immanent frame. The Overhuman 
celebrates what is exceptional in the human being. Although the figure of the Overhuman 
is constructed out of the shadow of God, Nietzsche’s aim is to eclipse the metaphysical 
faith of Christianity with a post-metaphysical approach to life, a spiritualized physics that 
affirms human capacities without promoting conformity. 
Due to the tragic nature of life and the psychological reliance that people have on 
faith, Nietzsche thinks a spiritual symbol is needed in order to avoid nihilism and the 
“last man” mentality. In Z Nietzsche writes, “Once one said ‘God’ when one looked upon 
distance seas; but now I have taught you to say: Overhuman” (Z II “Upon the Isles of the 
Blest”). People still require hope, especially those seeking knowledge that have faced the 
brutality of human mortality and the ephemeral nature of truth. The Overhuman is hope 
taken in a new form, a hope that rejects the metaphysical faith that truth is divine (GS 
344) by creating a figure that is humanly thinkable and attainable and can only come into 
existence through the human (Z II “Upon the Isles of the Blest”) and through human 
relationships. Described by Zarathustra as a sea in which one can submerge great 
despising, but also as lighting and madness (Z P 3), the Overhuman, as a Dionysian 
figure of impermanence, is meant to provide redemption from suffering through the 
linked and repetitive movements of destruction and creation in the human world (Z II 
“Upon the Isles of the Blest”). This means continued knowledge-seeking and self-
 questioning: the refinement of the intellectual conscience so that one can create one’s 
own truths and values (and perhaps later overturn them in order to start the process 
again). When friends strive to grow and change with and against each other in their very 
human worlds, the symbol of the Overhuman provides a goal to push toward, acting as a 
catalyst that reveals to the friends their übermenschlich traits and potentialities.   
Instead of seeking justification or reward for the pursuit of knowledge in something 
divine like God or absolute truth, the Overhuman is given by Nietzsche as a symbol that 
lacks definitive substance, but is nevertheless an instrument of provocation to inspire 
overcoming. The Overhuman is not one person or a God, nor is it meant to be idolized; it 
is that imagined, very possible self that rigorously pursues open-ended truth in 
conjunction with the intellectual conscience and, through an accumulation of knowledge, 
learns how to overcome its burdens and become a creating human being, a transvaluator. 
Part of becoming Overhuman involves moving beyond the regular explication of one’s 
assumptions and attempting to demystify old values and beliefs.
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 This no-saying practice 
of Nietzschean truthfulness involves Redlichkeit and has a productive quality, for in 
bringing a process of questioning to one’s knowledge base, one already begins to form 
new ideas. In GS, Nietzsche’s notion of truth cannot be disconnected from production 
and artistry: truth is conceived as being inevitability and necessarily bound up with a 
creative drive. Nietzsche is attempting to give us greater awareness of it; he is even 
celebrating it so that this knowledge can bring us greater honesty. As Babette Babich has 
pointed out, “A gay science will need to know itself as art.”13 
Friends who come together in order to strive for truthfulness as probity are already 
taking one step toward becoming Overhuman; those who challenge and critique the 
 friend in an attempt to develop the intellectual conscience help to confront their inherited 
beliefs. Before one can become a creative leader, Nietzsche states that one must learn to 
question those characteristics which others have valued most and decide whether they are 
also to one’s own taste. Since self-observation is extremely difficult to accomplish, the 
intellectual sparring of friends can help one’s habits, beliefs and values to become more 
visible. The practice of Redlichkeit in passionate knowledge-seeking friendships brings 
attention to the value of the lived in social world and the potential of human relationships 
to facilitate change. For Nietzsche, friendship in GS and Z is closely connected to 
overcoming and to becoming Overhuman. But, this does not mean that the value of 
friendship is overridden by the Overhuman; friendship’s association with the Overhuman 
does not promote some kind of extreme individualism, as has been suggested by Ruth 
Abbey.
14
 Instead, making the goal of friendship the Overhuman gives an immanent 
spiritual meaning to human relationships, one that Nietzsche considers vital for the 
thriving of the human spirit. Nietzsche’s conception of friendship is connected to a 
broader understanding of human flourishing that emphasizes the passionate and measured 
pursuit of knowledge in the interest of overcoming and creative re-evaluation.  
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